The commitment of bits between two mutually distrustful parties is a powerful cryptographic primitive with which many cryptographic objectives can be achieved. It is widely believed that unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment is impossible due to quantum entanglement cheating, which is codified in a general impossibility theorem. Gaps in the proof of this impossibility theorem are found. An unconditionally secure bit commitment protocol utilizing anonymous quantum states and the no-clone theorem is presented below with a full security proof.
Quantum cryptography [1] , the study of information security systems involving quantum effects, has recently been associated almost exclusively with the cryptographic objective of key distribution. This is due primarily to the nearly universal acceptance of the general impossibility of secure quantum bit commitment (QBC), taken to be a consequence of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) type entanglement cheating which rules out QBC and other quantum protocols that have been proposed for various other cryptographic objectives [2] .
In a bit commitment scheme, one party, Adam, provides another party, Babe, with a piece of evidence that he has chosen a bit b (0 or 1) which is committed to her. Later, Adam would "open" the commitment: revealing the bit b to Babe and convincing her that it is indeed the committed bit with the evidence in her possession. The usual concrete example is for Adam to write down the bit on a piece of paper which is then locked in a safe to be given to Babe, while keeping for himself the safe key that can be presented later to open the commitment. The evidence should be binding, i.e., Adam should not be able to change it, and hence the bit, after it is given to Babe. It should also be concealing, i.e., Babe should not be able to tell from it what the bit b is. Otherwise, either Adam or Babe would be able to cheat successfully.
In standard cryptography, secure bit commitment is to be achieved either through a trusted third party or by invoking an unproved assumption on the complexity of certain computational problem. By utilizing quantum effects, various QBC schemes not involving a third party have been proposed that were supposed to be unconditionally secure, in the sense that neither Adam nor Babe can cheat with any significant probability of success as a matter of physical laws. In 1995-1997, a general proof on the impossibility of unconditionally secure QBC and the insecurity of previously proposed protocols were described [3] - [6] . Henceforth, it has been accepted that secure QBC and related objectives are impossible as a matter of principle [7] - [8] .
Since there is no known characterization of all possible QBC protocols (or indeed all possible cryptographic protocols of any kind) with corresponding performance characterization, logically there can really be no general impossibility proof even if it were indeed impossible to have a secure QBC protocol. In this paper, a QBC scheme utilizing anonymous states and decoy states will be presented with an unconditional security proof. The basic reason for its success is that the flow of classical information between the two parties is not properly accounted for in the impossibility proof. The results are developed within nonrelativistic quantum mechanics, unrelated to relativistic protocols [9] . The QBC framework is as follows.
When Adam picks b = 0 to commit to Babe, he sends her a state |φ i ∈ H B with probability p i within fixed openly known sets {|φ i } and {p i } for i ∈ {1, · · · , M}. When he picks b = 1, he sends |φ ′ i ∈ H B from another fixed openly known set {|φ ′ i } with probabilities {p ′ i }. The {|φ i } and {φ ′ i } are so chosen that they are concealing as evidence, i.e., Babe cannot reliably discriminate between them in optimum binary quantum hypothesis testing [10] . They would also be binding if Adam is honest and sends them as they are, which he could not change after Babe receives them. In that case, when Adam reveals the bit by telling exactly which state |φ i or |φ ′ i he sent, Babe can measure the corresponding projector to verify the bit. In general, Babe can always guess the bit with a probability of success
, while Adam should not be able to change a committed bit at all. However, it is meaningful and common to grant unconditional security when the bestP 
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By applying a unitary U A that brings {|ê k } to {|ê [13] . How is the impossibility proof supposed to work in this case? It appears from [4] , and especially [5] , that such classical randomness introduced in the protocol is to be turned into quantum determinateness via quantum entanglement purification of a mixed quantum state. Such a prescription fails to preserve the protocol for several reasons [13] , one of which is exploited in the protocol QBC3 to be described in this paper. Generally, the impossibility proof appears to suffer from the glaring and severe scope problem -why are all possible QBC protocols covered by its transparently very specific formulation? For example, why are ρ B 0 and ρ B 1 necessarily the marginal states obtained by tracing over the states generated by Adam as in (1)? Protocol QBC3 shows clearly that this is not the case. A precise specification of QBC3 with a full security proof will be given after the following description of how the protocol works.
Let the state |ψ sent by Babe be an arbitrary state of a qubit, a two-dimensional quantum state space. Thus it is described by a three-dimensional unit vector on the Bloch-Poincaré sphere [14] . Let U 0 = I and U 1 = R(θ, C), a rotation by an angle θ on some great circle C on the sphere. To fix ideas, we may let θ = π, so that U 0 |ψ and U 1 |ψ are orthogonal when |ψ is on C, but this choice is not mandatory. It is clear that Adam cannot cheat in this case, since there is only one possible state for each bit value, and so no possibility for entanglement -assuming, as in the impossibility proof, that he is going to maintain a perfect opening for b = 0, so that entanglement cheating is to be used for opening b = 1.
The general case will be dealt with later. On the other hand, Babe can cheat perfectly by measuring the basis {|ψ , R(π, C)|ψ } with |ψ on C. If the two states U 0 |ψ and U 1 |ψ are chosen to be close to makeP 
each named by its position in the sequence -e.g., state i describes the qubit occupying the nonoverlapping ith time interval. In ( Since Adam still cannot cheat via entanglement -he needs to identify the exact qubit (indeed local state invariance [13] would be violated if he could cheat via entanglement) -it is clear that he can only cheat with a fixed (not arbitrarily small) probability; for |ψ on C it isP A c = 1/2, corresponding to the probability that a randomly chosen state on C could be accepted as a fixed given state on C. This cheating probability 1/2 is obtained by announcing another |ψ i = U 0 |ψ to be U 1 |ψ . With perfect opening on b = 0, the no-clone theorem [15, 16] can now be seen. For her verification in QBC3, Babe only accepts one state |ψ i , the state finally sent, and thus is using her measurement result, while the measurement result for such classical randomness is implicitly assumed not to be used in the impossibility proof, which in fact does not carry any description of the utilization of such measurement results. It is precisely such total lack of any role for classical information flow and utilization between the two parties that makes the impossibility proof severely limited in scope, and incorrect as a general proof. This problem also manifests itself in opening other gaps in the impossibility proof, see [13] for further discussion.
While the above development shows how and why the impossibility proof breaks down, it
does not yet show that unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment is possible becausē 
each randomly and independently chosen from C and named by its temporal position j. To see thatP A c can be made arbitrarily small, we have already showed that Adam has no entanglement cheating since he has to identify each individual qubit and there is only one states associated with each bit value for each qubit. Optimal one-to-two cloner for each qubit from (4) can be employed, with an appropriate criterion given by the average over individual qubit inner products that yieldsp described above. While there are many results in the literature on approximate cloning [17] , the most general one appropriate to our criterion p does not seem to have been worked out. Nevertheless,p is some fixed number, so that 
where σ b , occurring in each of the n positions with equal probability, is the qubit state U b σU † b modulated by Adam with σ = |ψ ψ| if Babe sends a pure state. Since [10, 18 ]
where · 1 is the trace norm [14, 18] , and ρ (5) is diagonal in the product basis that diagonalizes σ 0 − σ 1 on each qubit, one finds straightforwardly from (6) that, assuming
where λ + ≤ 1 is the positive eigenvalue of σ 0 − σ 1 . The optimal probability in (7) can be obtained by measuring in the above product basis and setting b = 0 or 1 according to a majority vote on the positive and negative ouctomes (corresponding to the eigenvectors |λ + and |λ − ). Since (7) also impliesP
the optimal strategy is better than guessing at the qubit sent, which yieldsP 
is bounded above by (m + 1)/(2 √ πl ′ ) that goes to zero for large l ′ = (n − m)/2. To handle her possible entanglement on (4), it is simpler to proceed as follows instead of using (6) directly.
To use her entanglement, Babe needs to pick m out of n qubit positions, to which she would adjoin her entangled qubits for measurement. For each choice, the probability that none of these m positions would overlap with any of the qubits she sent in the n-sequence 
where J is the set of (n) m m-positions out of n, and σ mb denotes the joint m-qubit state for The resulting optimal quantum performance cannot be better than that of optimizing a classical joint distribution or the corresponding Kolmogorov distance [14, 18] , because there is no compatible basis issue in the classical case. A direct term-by-term bounding of the Kolmogorov distance shows that the optimal classical solution indeed corresponds to the independent uniform-state qubits one indicated above, which is expected if only because Babe cannot effectively use any correlation between any of the m qubits without knowing their positions. Note that Babe is actually not advised to send uniform qubit states to Adam, who can then clone much better in an m-to-2m approximate cloner.
Protocol QBC3 achieves unconditional security with the use of anonymous states to thwart Adam's cheating and decoy states to thwart Babe's cheating. In [13] , it will be shown that anonymous states alone without decoy states could lead to unconditional security in a more complicated protocol QBC1, in which Babe's cheating is thwarted via bit hashing. [19] The irrelevance of Babe's entanglement can also be observed from the fact that even if one grants that the adjoined positions of the entangled qubits are correct for each possible m-qubit position in J, one is still left with ρ B b of the form (10) .
